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Multiple types of reward, such as money, food or social approval, are capable of
driving behavior. However, most previous investigations have only focused on one
of these reward classes in isolation, as such it is not clear whether different reward
classes have a unique influence on instrumental responding or whether the subjective
value of the reward, rather than the reward type per se, is most important in driving
behavior. Here, we investigate behavior using a well-established reward paradigm,
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT), and three different reward types: monetary, food
and social rewards. The subjective value of each reward type was matched using a
modified Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction where subjective reward value was
expressed through physical effort using a bimanual grip force task. We measured the
influence of reward-associated stimuli on how participants distributed forces between
hands when reaching a target effort range on the screen bimanually and on how much
time participants spent in this target range. Participants spent significantly more time
in the target range (15% ± 2% maximal voluntary contraction) when a stimulus was
presented that was associated with a reward used during instrumental conditioning
or Pavlovian conditioning compared to a stimulus associated with a neutral outcome
(i.e., general PIT). The strength of the PIT effect was modulated by subjective value
(i.e., individuals who showed a stronger PIT effect rated the value of rewards more
highly), but not by reward type, demonstrating that stimuli of all reward types were able
to act as appetitive reinforcers and influenced instrumental responding, when matched
to the same subjective reward value. This is the first demonstration that individually
matched monetary, food and social rewards are equally effective as appetitive reinforcers
in PIT. These findings strengthen the hypotheses that the subjective value is crucial for
how much reward-associated stimuli influence behavior.
Keywords: Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer, cue-controlled behavior, Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction,
reward type, subjective reward value, effort
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INTRODUCTION
Our environment consists of numerous stimuli that are capable
of predicting many different types of reward. When deciding
how to act, it is commonly assumed that these reward-
associated stimuli are compared in order to choose the option
associated with the highest value. More generally, there is
ample evidence that reward-predicting stimuli can consciously or
unconsciously exert a strong influence on behavior (Pessiglione
et al., 2008; Holmes et al., 2010; Watson et al., 2016). Despite
the well-established links between rewards and actions, one
important open question is whether different reward types
(i.e., monetary, food or social rewards) are equally effective in
motivating behavior.
An important issue is whether different reward types use a
separate or a shared valuation system in the brain (Lin et al.,
2012; Ruff and Fehr, 2014). Some evidence suggests that, for
example, social rewards activate the social cognition network
whereas higher-order rewards, such as money, are processed in
the anterior part of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC;
Saxe, 2006; Sescousse et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014).
Thus, there is some evidence that different reward types are
processed in separate dedicated neural circuits. By contrast,
other studies focused on the computation of subjective values
for different outcomes, which allows the brain to map different
reward types on a common scale to guide choices (Plassmann
et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008; Peters and Büchel, 2010; Rangel
and Hare, 2010; Levy and Glimcher, 2011; Clithero and Rangel,
2014). The vmPFC, when the value representation is choice-
dependent, the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), when the value
representation happens automatically and the ventral striatum
seem to be the main brain regions involved in the computation
of subjective value across different reward modalities (Lin
et al., 2012; Clithero and Rangel, 2014; Grueschow et al.,
2015).
The aim of the present study was to test the influence
of reward-associated stimuli on instrumental responding in
humans using primary (food), secondary (money) and social
(smiling individual in a thumbs-up pose) rewards, while
accounting for subjective differences in the valuation of each
reward type. Specifically, we tested two alternative hypotheses.
First, we hypothesized that behavior is influenced by reward-
associated stimuli independent of reward type, when rewards
were individually matched to the same subjective value. Our
second competing hypothesis was that stimuli associated with
different reward types influence behavior differently, even when
the different reward types are equated for subjective value.
This might be the case when different reward types use an
alternative mechanism to influence instrumental responding or
if the reward values are not fully mapped onto a common scale.
Furthermore, regardless of whether or not distinct reward types
influence behavior differentially, we expected that participants
who evaluated the rewards as more valuable (i.e., had a higher
subjective value) would show a stronger influence of reward-
associated stimuli on behavior.
In order to test our hypotheses, we first measured the
subjective values of different reward types such as money,
chocolate and a smiling face with a modified Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (BDM) auction using motor effort to individually
match the magnitude of monetary and food rewards to the
same subjective value as the social reward. These matched
rewards were then presented as outcomes during instrumental
conditioning, where a response-outcome contingency was
learned and Pavlovian conditioning, where a stimulus-
outcome contingency was learned. Subsequently, we tested
how instrumental responding is influenced by stimuli associated
with different reward types under extinction by showing the
same stimuli as presented during Pavlovian conditioning in
the background meanwhile participants made instrumental
responses. This experimental procedure is called Pavlovian-to-
instrumental transfer (PIT). The PIT phenomenon has been
widely investigated in both animals (for review see Holmes et al.,
2010) and humans (Bray et al., 2008; Talmi et al., 2008; Huys
et al., 2011, 2016; Prévost et al., 2012; Lewis et al., 2013; Watson
et al., 2014; Cartoni et al., 2015; Garofalo and di Pellegrino,
2015; Lovibond et al., 2015; Sebold et al., 2016; Quail et al., 2017)
making this a useful model for translational research and in
addressing our questions about potential reward-type specific
influences on behavior.
We found that the strength of the PIT effect was indeed
modulated by subjective value such that individuals who showed
a stronger PIT effect rated the value of rewards more highly.
However, PIT effects were not systematically different between
reward types, demonstrating that monetary, food, and social
reward types, if matched on subjective reward value, were equally
effective in acting as appetitive reinforcers and in influencing
behavior.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Sixty-five healthy volunteers (self-reported absence of any
physical or psychiatric conditions) were recruited via a university
website. All participants gave written informed consent to take
part in the experiment. The participants were instructed that
the rewards collected during instrumental (depending on their
performance) and Pavlovian conditioning will be received at the
end of the experiment. The last part of the experiment (PIT
test) was conducted under full extinction (i.e., no rewards were
available). After completing all aspects of the experiment, all
participants were reimbursed at a fixed rate of 20 Swiss Francs
per hour and one package of Maltesersr chocolate sweets.
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the Ethics Committee of the Federal
Institute of Technology Zurich with written informed consent
from all subjects. All subjects gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical
Association, 2013). We excluded 19 participants because the
matching of different reward types was not possible (10), or
the Pavlovian conditioning was unsuccessful (3) or they did
not follow the instructions (6). The final sample (N = 46, mean
age = 25.34, standard deviation = 5.76) consisted of 20 men and
4 left-handers.
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General Procedure
All participants completed a number of questionnaires. Before
starting the experiment, participants filled in a handedness
questionnaire (Oldfield, 1971) and after the experimental
procedure, they answered six multiple choice questions to figure
out whether they pursued a conscious strategy during PIT. If
they confirmed the first question about using a strategy during
PIT, participants were asked to specify their strategy in an
open answer. The other five questions offered different strategies
and they were told to mark whether or not the strategy was
used. In order not to influence the participants’ first answer,
we put these questions on a new page. The following strategies
were offered: (1) I ignored the fractals (reversed item); (2) If
a fractal was shown, which was associated with a reward that
I received for either dominant or non-dominant hand use in
the first block, I chose to squeeze with the corresponding hand
more strongly (corresponds to a specific PIT effect); (3) If
a fractal was shown that was previously associated with any
of the three rewards, I decided to stay longer in the target
(corresponds to a general PIT); (4) If a fractal was shown that
was previously associated with my favorite reward, I decided to
stay longer in the target; (5) If the fractal was shown that was
previously associated with no reward, I decided to not put a
lot of effort and to only stay in the target for a short period
of time. Based on these six questions, we calculated a total
score.
Participants were comfortably seated in a silent room in front
of the laptop. The experimental session beganwith calibrating the
grip force handles and measuring the maximal grip force of each
hand (mean out of three maximal voluntary contractions; MVC).
The required force (50% and 15% of MVC) to reach the target on
the screen for the subsequent experimental blocks was computed
based on this measurement.
Participants were required to pay attention to the screen
and to follow the instructions described at the beginning of
each experimental block. Before starting the experiment, several
example trials were shown by the experimenter and if needed,
further explanations were given.
The whole experiment consisted of four different blocks:
(1) the modified BDM auction; (2) the instrumental
conditioning; (3) the Pavlovian conditioning; and (4) the
PIT (Figure 1).
The BDM was used to match the subjective value of the
monetary and food rewards to the subjective value of the social
reward. These individually matched rewards were then used as
reinforcing outcomes for all subsequent paradigms.
After the BDM procedure, participants underwent
instrumental conditioning, where they learned two response-
outcome contingencies. Participants performed separate
effort tasks with their dominant and non-dominant hands
and received a specific type of reward if the motor action
was performed successfully (hand-reward pairings were
counterbalanced across participants). For example, one person
might learn that squeezing with the dominant hand lead to
a monetary reward whilst squeezing with the non-dominant
hand lead to a food reward, while another might learn that
squeezing with the dominant hand lead to a social reward whilst
squeezing with the non-dominant hand lead to a monetary
reward.
Once participants had acquired the response-outcome
contingencies, they underwent Pavlovian conditioning. In the
Pavlovian conditioning trials, participants learned four different
stimulus-outcome contingencies. Three stimuli were associated
with one of the three reward-type outcomes (i.e., food, money
or social reward) and a fourth stimulus was associated with a
neutral outcome. Recall that for each participant, two of the three
reward types were also previously presented during instrumental
conditioning.
Lastly, we used PIT to investigate the influence of Pavlovian
stimuli on instrumental responding. Here, the participants were
instructed that they should squeeze the grip force handles
bimanually, that they were free to distribute forces between
hands and that they could stay inside a pre-defined target
(set at 15% ± 2% MVC) for as long as they wanted to but
maximally for the whole trial duration (6 s). In the end, this
PIT paradigm allowed us to look at the force ratio between
hands as a measure for the so-called ‘‘specific PIT’’ and at the
time spent inside the target meaning how long they held the
cursor at the required target force level or above as a measure
for ‘‘general PIT’’. A specific PIT is when a Pavlovian stimulus
associated with a particular outcome selectively enhances the
instrumental responding associated with that specific outcome
(Corbit and Balleine, 2005; Cartoni et al., 2013). For example,
participants squeeze more with their dominant hand when they
observe the Pavlovian stimulus because both the stimulus and
response have been paired with the monetary reward previously
(i.e., via stimulus-outcome-response contingency). A general
PIT effect is when a Pavlovian stimulus associated with a
different reward engenders more instrumental responding for all
outcomes (Corbit and Balleine, 2005; Cartoni et al., 2013). For
example, participants spent more time in the target when they
observe a stimulus, which was not paired with an instrumental
action before.
Modified Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
Auction
The aim of this experimental block was to match the magnitude
of the monetary and food reward to the subjective value of the
social reward. Instead of bidding a certain amount of money
for different outcomes as in the original BDM (Becker et al.,
1964; Plassmann et al., 2007), we used physical effort as a
common ‘‘currency’’ to quantify the subjective value of outcomes
(Figure 1A). In a first step, participants had to hold a cursor
for a certain number of seconds (randomized between 1 s and
10 s) in the target by squeezing the grip force handles bimanually
with 50% of their MVC. After each trial, participants could
recover for 10 s. This block was conducted in order to give the
participants a better feeling for physical effort. During the actual
BDM experiment, images of different reward magnitudes and
reward types were presented (pseudo-randomized, 5 s) and after
each reward, participants were required to bid the number of
seconds (0–10) that they were willing to squeeze the grip force
handles with 50% of their MVC to receive the presented reward.
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FIGURE 1 | Graphical illustration of the experimental paradigm. (A) Participants were presented with the potential outcomes, for example a certain amount of
money (upper row) or food (lower row). Participants then bid how many seconds (0–10 s) they would be willing to apply 50% of their maximal grip force in order to
receive the displayed reward. If their bid was greater or equal to the random number (upper trial), they had to perform the action which was visualized as the small
white filled square going inside the white unfilled rectangle. Otherwise (lower trial) they did not have to do anything but did not win the reward. Lastly, these bids were
used to match the monetary and food reward to the subjective value of the social reward. (B) During the instrumental conditioning, participants either used their
dominant (upper trial) or non-dominant hand (lower trial) to reach the target, which was set on 15% of their maximal grip force. If the cursor was held between 2 s
and 4 s within the target they received a reward. Each hand was paired with one randomly assigned reward type (i.e., money for squeezing with the dominant hand,
food for squeezing with the non-dominant hand). (C) During the Pavlovian conditioning, participants learned four associations between fractals and outcomes. Three
outcomes were rewarding, whereas two of them were the same as during instrumental conditioning (upper two trials) and one was neutral (last trial). (D) During the
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer, participants performed the same task as during instrumental conditioning but bimanually and under extinction. The same stimuli
as in Pavlovian conditioning were shown in the background.
Then, the computer displayed (3 s) a random number between
0 and 10. If the random number was less than or equal to their
bid, they had to exert a force of 50% of their MVC for the number
of seconds equal to the random number, else they did not have
to perform the squeezing. The social reward, which represented
the social approval given by a smiling person in a thumbs-up
pose (opposite gender than the participant and combined with
joyful sound), was presented first. This was followed by randomly
presented different amounts of Swiss Francs (0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1.0,
1.2, 1.5, 2.0) and pieces of chocolate (1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12). Based
on the participant’s bids, we matched the reward magnitude
of the monetary and food rewards to the bid for the social
reward.
Instrumental Conditioning
Participants were instructed to either use their dominant or
non-dominant hand to reach a target (15% MVC), which
was displayed for 6 s on the screen (Figure 1B). To prevent
participants from squeezing with both hands simultaneously,
bimanual hand use was disabled by setting the cursor to zero
when a certain amount of force (>0.5 N over 300 ms) was
detected for both hands simultaneously. The participants’ goal
of the block was to learn which reward they received when
they used either their dominant or non-dominant hand to
reach the target (e.g., dominant hand use leads to money,
non-dominant hand use leads to food). The participants had
to exert 15% MVC for 2–4 s (1/3 or 2/3 of the 6 s target
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display) to receive a reward. This rewarded time window was
kept the same for both hands and over all trials. Participants
received an outcome depending on which hand they used. The
assignment of two out of the three matched rewards to either
the dominant or non-dominant hand was random. An image
of the specific reward in successful trials or a black screen in
unsuccessful trials was displayed for 5 s. After 20 successful
trials, the participants were asked, which reward they received
after dominant or non-dominant hand use. If the answer was
correct the instrumental conditioning was terminated, else the
instrumental conditioning was repeated until they conducted
another 20 successful trials. All participants answered the query
correctly after a second block of instrumental conditioning
(i.e., 40 trials) at the latest.
Pavlovian Conditioning
In this experimental block, participants learned the associations
between four Pavlovian stimuli (gray-scaled fractals) and four
outcomes (Figure 1C). Three outcomes were positive (matched
monetary, food and social rewards) and one was neutral (black
screen). Therefore, participants experienced three rewarding
outcomes during Pavlovian conditioning, while they experienced
only two during instrumental conditioning. The associations
between the Pavlovian stimuli and outcomes were pseudo-
randomized across participants. A reinforcement schedule of
80% was administered (20% of trials were followed by the neutral
outcome). The Pavlovian stimuli as well as the appropriate
outcome were presented for 2 s. The inter-trial interval was
3 s. To increase the participant’s attention, they had to press
the space bar every time a reward was displayed on the
screen (although participants were told that pressing this space
had no impact on reward outcome). After 60 randomized
trials (15 per condition), the stimulus-outcome associations
were tested. If the answers were incorrect, the procedure was
repeated (120 trials in total) and otherwise the Pavlovian
conditioning was terminated. Participants who did not learn the
associations after 120 trials were excluded (see ‘‘Participants’’
Section).
Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer
Participants were instructed to use both hands simultaneously
to reach the target (15% of the mean MVC of both hands)
and that they will not receive any rewards anymore (i.e., under
extinction). In each trial, we assessed whether the Pavlovian
stimulus, shown full screen in the background for 6 s, influenced
the extent to which participants distributed forces between hands
(ratio between non-dominant and dominant force production)
and how much time they spent in the target effort range
(Figure 1D). A specific PIT predicts that the presentation
of a specific stimulus (i.e., fractal A) will transfer to a
specific response (i.e., stronger contribution of the dominant
hand) because both the stimulus and the response have been
paired with the same outcome during the instrumental and
Pavlovian conditioning blocks. A general PIT effect would
predict that the participants will spend more time in target
when a stimulus was presented that has previously been
associated with any reward. The inter-trial interval was 3 s. The
PIT consisted of 80 randomly presented trials (20 trials per
condition).
Stimuli and Materials
We used four gray-scaled fractals as stimuli during the
Pavlovian conditioning and PIT, which were matched to the
same luminance and complexity (Willenbockel et al., 2010).
Furthermore, we used images of coins (Swiss Francs), pieces of
chocolate (Malteserr) and a smiling individual in a thumbs-up
pose (opposite gender than the participant and combined with
joyful sound) on a black background as reinforcing outcomes
during the modified BDM auction, instrumental conditioning
and Pavlovian conditioning (see e.g., Figure 1). The social
rewards were meant to convey social approval and serve as a
social reinforcer.
The experiment was programmed in LabView (National
Instruments, Austin, TX, USA) and ran on a notebook (HP
EliteBook 840, HP Company, Palo Alto, CA, USA). We used
two custom-built grip force handles, printed by a 3D printer
(Ultimaker2, Ultimaker B.V., Geldermalsen, Netherlands). Each
grip force handle was 10 cm long and had an oval shape
(diameters = 4.5 cm and 3.5 cm respectively). Two force sensors
(FC22, Measurement Specialties, Fremont, CA, USA) were put
inside the printed cases. Both handles were connected to a data
acquisition box (NI USB-6009, National Instruments, Austin,
TX, USA), which was then connected to the notebook and
sampled with 200 Hz. A grip force handle was held in each
hand, which allowed us to accurately measure the force produced
by each hand during the modified BDM auction, instrumental
conditioning and PIT.
Analysis
Data was processed with a custom-made made script (Matlab
2013, MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). We applied an adjusted
boxplot criterion to correct for outliers within each condition
and subject (Hubert and Vandervieren, 2008). Data points of
subjects that differed more from the mean than ± 2.5 standard
deviations were further considered as outliers and therefore,
rejected from the analysis. Data was statically analyzed using
mixed-effects models in SPSS 23 (IBM, Armonk, NY, USA).
Mixed-effects models are more robust to non-normal distributed
data and show a better fit for repeated measurements than
conventional ANOVAs (Gueorguieva and Krystal, 2004; Gelman
and Hill, 2007). PIT condition (hand one (H1), hand two (H2),
no instrumental conditioning (No IC), Neutral) and reward type
(money, food, social) were modeled as fixed effects depending
on the analysis, and subjects were modeled as a random effect
with random intercepts. We chose a compound symmetry
covariance structure. Additionally, depending on the hypothesis,
we added the subjective value as a covariate to the mixed-effects
model. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc tests were applied if a
significant main effect was detected in a mixed-effects model.
We reported either Cohen’s d as a measure for effect size (small
d = 0.20–0.49, medium d = 0.50–0.80, large d > 0.80; Cohen,
1988) or r (small r = 0.1–0.29,medium r = 0.3–0.49, large r> 0.5;
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Field, 2013). Furthermore, we used a Spearman’s correlation
to show the relationship between subjective reward value and
general PIT effect. In order to show equivalence between the
different reward types, we conducted robust equivalence tests
for paired samples (Yuen and Dixon, 1973; Schuirmann, 1981)
using the software R (R Development Core Team, 2008). These
tests make no assumptions about normality (Yuen and Dixon,
1973).
RESULTS
Modified Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
Auction
The aim of the BDM was to match monetary and food
rewards to the same subjective reward value as the social
reward. The subjective value of the social reward was rated
in average as 6.26 (range: 2–10), which means that on
average, participants bid 6.26 s of 50% grip force effort to
receive a social reward. The corresponding matched monetary
reward magnitude was on average 0.6 Swiss Francs (standard
deviation = 0.6) and the corresponding matched food reward
magnitude was on average four pieces of chocolate (standard
deviation = 3).
To our knowledge, no previous study has used effort as a
common currency for the BDM auction. We therefore analyzed
the relationship between different amounts of Swiss Francs,
as well as chocolate, and the subjective value quantified as
physical effort. As expected, the higher the reward magnitude,
the higher the subjective reward value, which represented an
increased willingness to exert effort. This was supported by
a strong positive correlation between reward magnitude and
subjective value (monetary: p ≤ 0.001, r = 0.9837, N = 44;
food: p ≤ 0.001, r = 0.9831, N = 42). Note that even though
the monetary and food reward were not matched directly
to each other, the corresponding amounts reflect the actual
market value surprisingly well (0.15 Swiss Francs per piece
of chocolate) confirming the face validity of our modified
BDM.
Instrumental and Pavlovian Conditioning
All participants successfully learned the associations during
instrumental conditioning, with 89% (41 participants) needing
20 successful trials, and the others, 40 successful trials to
learn the associations. Also all participants successfully
learned the associations during Pavlovian conditioning,
with 63% (29 participants) needing 60 trials and the rest
120 trials.
General Pavlovian-to-Instrumental
Transfer
To test for a general PIT effect, we compared the time spent in the
target when each of the four different stimuli were presented in
the background (see ‘‘Analysis’’ Section). The time spent inside
the target range was used as a measure of the general PIT effect,
because the criterion for receiving a reward in the instrumental
task was based on time spent in the target range. Our
mixed-effects analysis showed that previously learned stimulus
associations significantly influenced the time participants spent
inside the target force range (FCondition (3,129) = 6.373, pCondition
≤ 0.001, N = 44), such that participants spent significantly
more time in the target when a reward-associated stimulus was
presented compared to a neutral stimulus (p-value adjusted for
multiple comparisons, pH1-Neutral ≤ 0.025, dH1-Neutral = 0.36,
pH2-Neutral ≤ 0.025, dH2-Neutral = 0.26, pNo IC-Neutral ≤ 0.025,
dNo IC-Neutral = 0.31; Figure 2A).
The Impact of Subjective Value on General
Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer
The magnitude of the PIT effect increased in proportion to the
subjective value of the rewards. When looking at the magnitude
of PIT, defined as the difference between the No IC and Neutral
condition, we observed that participants with higher general
subjective values for the rewards also showed a higher general
PIT (Figure 2B; r = 0.389, p ≤ 0.025, N = 43).
The magnitude of the general PIT furthermore significantly
correlated with awareness scores (r = 0.608, p ≤ 0.001, N = 43).
Thus, participants who pursued a conscious strategy during
the PIT test showed a higher general PIT effect. A conscious
strategy means that participants were able to report an explicit
strategy relating the fractal identity to effort levels during
debriefing after the PIT test. These conscious strategies were
assessed separately from the quantification of contingency
awareness after the instrumental and Pavlovian conditioning.
All participants found to be unaware of the contingencies
were excluded from the analyses (see ‘‘Participants’’
Section).
The Impact of Different Reward Types on
General Pavlovian-to-Instrumental
Transfer
We examined the influence of reward type on general PIT in two
ways. First, we used the rewards assigned to the No IC condition
as a pure measure of Pavlovian influences because these rewards
had no previous instrumental associations. Specifically, we
computed the general PIT effect as the difference between the
No IC and Neutral conditions. Each of the three reward types
served as theNo IC reward for a subset of the participants.Money,
Food, and Social rewards were used in theNo IC condition for 12,
16, and 15 participants, respectively. Our mixed-effects analysis
suggested that all reward types were equally able to induce a
general PIT effect (FReward Type (2,39) = 1.469, pReward Type = 0.243;
dMoney-Food = 0.00, dMoney-Social = −0.24, dFood-Social = −0.31;
N = 43; Figure 2C). Nevertheless, general PIT was modulated
by the individual level of motivation (added Subjective Value
as a discrete covariate to the mixed-effects model), such that
participants with a higher level of motivation, showed a stronger
general PIT (FSubjective Value (1,39) = 9.538, pSubjective Value ≤ 0.025;
N = 43).
Second, we tested the level of general PIT for all rewards
collapsed across all preceding instrumental conditions (H1,
H2, No IC) in order to achieve more statistical power in a
within-subjects design. We computed the general PIT effects
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FIGURE 2 | General Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT). (A) A general PIT effect was found, given the significant increase in time in target for stimuli paired
with a reward (Hand one 1 (H1), Hand two (H2), no instrumental conditioning (No IC)) compared to Neutral (∗p ≤ 0.025, N = 44). Error bars indicate the standard
error of the mean and asterisks indicate significant Bonferroni-corrected comparisons to Neutral (p ≤ 0.025). (B) General PIT defined as the difference between the
No IC—Neutral condition significantly correlated with the subjective value (r = 0.389, p ≤ 0.025, N = 43). Values above the dashed horizontal line show a general PIT.
The gray line indicates a linear fit. (C) The influence of reward type (money in orange, food in blue, social in green) on general PIT. Outliers according to a boxplot
criterion are not depicted here because we applied a different criterion (mean ± 2.5 standard deviations). No statistical difference was found (p = 0.243, N = 43).
Numbers in brackets indicate the number of participants for each reward type. The dashed gray line indicates no difference between No IC and Neutral. (D) General
PIT collapsed across all instrumental conditions (H1, H2, No IC) in a within-subjects design depicted for each reward type (money in orange, food in blue, social in
green). Outliers according to a boxplot criterion are not depicted here because we applied a different criterion (mean ± 2.5 standard deviations). No statistical
difference was found (p = 0.077, N = 42). The dashed gray line indicates no difference between the rewarding conditions and Neutral.
as the difference between each rewarding condition and the
Neutral condition and assigned each general PIT effect to
the corresponding reward type. We also found no statistical
difference between reward types (FReward Type (2,82) = 2.65,
pReward Type = 0.077; dMoney-Food = −0.09, dMoney-Social = 0.20,
dFood-Social = 0.31; N = 42; Figure 2D). Note that even though
the statistics approach the traditional significance cutoff of
0.05 for the factor Reward Type, all effect sizes were small,
which suggests only a minor practical relevance of reward type
in PIT.
Subsequently, we used robust equivalence tests (Yuen and
Dixon, 1973; Schuirmann, 1981) for paired samples to determine
if the general PIT effects of different reward types are similar
enough to be considered equivalent. The null hypothesis is
described as follows: the difference is more than or equal to the
predefined value of epsilon. We have chosen an epsilon value
equal to one-half standard deviation of the general PIT effect
across reward types (i.e., 250 ms). It is a common procedure to
use one-half standard deviation to define the minimal important
difference (Norman et al., 2003). We used a within-subjects
design by assigning the general PIT effects of the three rewarding
conditions (H1, H2, No IC) to the corresponding reward
type. This substantially increases the power for demonstrating
equivalence of the reward types. We detected a significant
equivalence between reward types (epsilon = 0.250 s, mean
difference money− food = 0.00, p≤ 0.025,mean difference money
− social = 0.04, p ≤ 0.025, mean difference food − social = 0.04,
p ≤ 0.025, N = 42).
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Specific Pavlovian-to-Instrumental
Transfer
In addition to an overall, reward-type independent response
invigoration or motivation (i.e., general PIT), PIT paradigms
have also been used to demonstrate outcome-specific PIT effects
(i.e., specific PIT; Holmes et al., 2010; Cartoni et al., 2016).
Our paradigm also allowed us to test for such specific PIT
effects by analyzing how much force was assigned to each
hand (dominant and non-dominant) when the four different
stimuli were shown in the background. Here, we briefly remind
the reader that specific outcomes (e.g., money, food, or social)
were paired with dominant (H1) or non-dominant (H2) hand
gripping. Therefore, in our bimanual grip force paradigm, a
specific PIT effect would be present if the fractals used for
the instrumental conditioning biased the force distribution
between the dominant and non-dominant hand towards or
away from the participant’s natural tendency to distribute
force quasi-equally between hands in the bimanual setting.
(i.e., H1 should result in a higher force contribution of the
dominant hand, and H2 in a higher force contribution of
the non-dominant hand). We calculated force ratios between
the non-dominant and the dominant hand (Figure 3), which
were all<1 indicating that a slight preference for squeezing with
the dominant hand remained intact in all cases. Importantly,
this preference was only moderately influenced by the presented
fractal (FCondition (3,123) = 3.26, pCondition ≤ 0.025, N = 42). In
particular, we found less non-dominant force contribution in
H2 than in Neutral (pH2-Neutral ≤ 0.025, p-value Bonferroni
adjusted for multiple comparisons, dH2-Neutral = −0.12), which
cannot be explained by the concept of specific PIT. Moreover,
no other significant differences were found (dH1-H2 = 0.07,
dH1-Neutral = −0.08, dNo IC-Neutral = 0.08), suggesting that a
specific PIT effect was not present when subjects responded with
bimanual grip force (Figure 3).
FIGURE 3 | Specific Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT). Error bars
indicate the standard error of the mean and asterisks indicate significant
Bonferroni-corrected comparisons to Neutral (p ≤ 0.025). Specific PIT looking
at the force ratio between the non-dominant and dominant hand. A statistical
difference was detected between hand two (H2) and Neutral condition
(∗p ≤ 0.025, N = 42). The dashed gray line indicates balanced hand use
(ratio = 1).
We have also conducted an analysis that examines the force
in specific PIT in more detail: (1) the timing (i.e., speed)
with which each hand reached 5% or 15% MVC, and (2) the
force ratio within the first 300 ms in the target range. We
found no indication of a specific PIT effect in either case
(Ftiming 5% (3,135) = 1.36, ptiming 5% = 0.258, Ntiming 5% = 46;
Ftiming 15% (3,135) = 1.68, ptiming 15% = 0.175, Ntiming 15% = 46;
Fratio 300 ms (3,120) = 1.01, pratio 300 ms = 0.389, Nratio 300 ms = 41).
Furthermore, we conducted another analysis investigating
possible specific PIT effects looking at the time spent inside the
target range. We calculated the time in target for trials where
the fractal and hand dominance were congruent vs. incongruent
to each other. A congruent trial was defined as a trial in which
the participant contributed more force with the hand that was
associated with the correct (i.e., rewarded) response for the
currently displayed fractal during instrumental conditioning.
Incongruent trials were the opposite and trials in which the
fractal was not associated with reward for any response during
instrumental conditioning were omitted. Note that this analysis
collapses across cases in which H1 and H2 were congruent or
incongruent in order to maximize power. We found no statistical
difference in the time participants spent inside the target range
between the congruent and incongruent trials (mixed-effects
model, FCondition (1,44) = 0.082, pCondition = 0.775), and thus no
indication of a specific PIT effect with this type of analysis either.
DISCUSSION
Our study was designed to investigate the influence of different
reward types on behavior, when each reward type was calibrated
to the same subjective value. A key feature of our study was
the modified BDM using motor effort, instead of money, as
a common currency. This allowed us to successfully match all
the different types of reward to the same subjective value and
then, conduct a well-controlled PIT experiment. Even though the
monetary and food reward were not matched directly to each
other, but rather calibrated independently to a specific subjective
value, the inferred exchange rate between chocolate and money
reflects the actual market value of a packet of Maltesersr
surprisingly well (0.15 Swiss Francs per piece of chocolate).
Furthermore, previous studies using an incentive force task have
shown that participants were willing to invest more effort for
higher reward magnitudes (Pessiglione et al., 2007; Ziauddeen
et al., 2012), which is in line with our results. Together, these two
findings confirm the validity of our modified BDM.
We showed that individually matched monetary, food and
social rewards successfully acted as appetitive reinforcers,
such that stimuli associated with these rewards influenced
instrumental behavior to a similar extent (Figure 2). Participants
were willing to invest more effort when reward-associated cues
were presented in the background compared to a neutral cue
(Figure 2), which is in line with previous PIT research in
humans (Bray et al., 2008; Talmi et al., 2008; Prévost et al.,
2012; Watson et al., 2014, 2016; Garofalo and di Pellegrino,
2015). Furthermore, this general PIT effect was stronger, the
higher the individual level of motivation, i.e., the higher the
subjective reward value (Figure 2). Thus, we have shown that
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subjective reward value influences PIT in humans. To our
knowledge, only one previous study in rodents has investigated
the impact of reward magnitude on PIT and found that specific
PIT was insensitive to reward magnitude (i.e., number of food
pellets received during learning) by comparing the size of
the PIT effect of a ‘‘low reward’’ to a ‘‘high reward’’ group
(van den Bos et al., 2004). However, in the rodent study it
is difficult to judge how strongly the subjective reward value
differed between the ‘‘low reward’’ vs. the ‘‘high reward’’ group
whereas subjective value was precisely measured here using the
modified BDM. It is also possible that the subjective value only
affects general PIT. Further research will be required to validate
the influence of subjective value on PIT in a within-subjects
design, which would have the advantage of being able to directly
compare the influence of stimuli associated with different reward
magnitudes on instrumental responding. Taken together, the
findings from the present study support the hypothesis that
the subjective reward value is an important determinant of
how strongly instrumental responding is influenced by reward-
associated stimuli.
We found no evidence that the reward type per se influences
the general PIT effect. The absence of any differences between
reward types in general PIT is in line with three different reward-
processing frameworks (although the frameworks themselves
make competing predictions in some cases).
First, Cartoni et al. (2013) link general PIT to utility so that a
result of the action can be more or less valuable depending on the
state of the agent (i.e., being hungry or sated). The motivational
effect of general PIT is observed if the stimulus signals an
unexpected, additional reward, which was previously not paired
with that particular action during instrumental conditioning,
increasing its utility. Thus, general PIT effects can be explained
by the ability of reward-associated cues to also indicate the
presence of other/additional rewards in the environment and
thus, motivate the person to act as if they constitute an added
value (Cartoni et al., 2013). Given that all rewards were value-
matched in the present study; the added value was the same for
every reward type.
Second, previous research has shown that general PIT effects
depend mainly on the model-free system, which accumulates
values through experience (i.e., temporal difference learning;
Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Dayan and Berridge, 2014; Garbusow
et al., 2014; Sebold et al., 2016). Model-free actions are by
definition not executed with respect to the identity of the
outcome. In the context of our study, a predominant engagement
of the model-free system would result in a negligible influence of
reward type on general PIT.
Third, the computation of subjective values for different
reward types allows to map different reward types on a common
scale to guide choices (Plassmann et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008;
Peters and Büchel, 2010; Rangel and Hare, 2010; Levy and
Glimcher, 2011; Clithero and Rangel, 2014). This common-value
framework also suggests that reward type itself would have a
negligible influence on behavior as long as different reward types
share the same subjective value.
Previous PIT studies have reported links between PIT
effects and neural structures that are believed to support the
computation of subjective reward values and reward learning.
A large body of research in humans and animal models has
identified a value-based choice and reward learning network
consisting of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), ventral tegmental area
(VTA), substantia nigra (SN), amygdala, nucleus accumbens
(NAcc) and vmPFC (for review see Ruff and Fehr, 2014).
Dopaminergic neurons in VTA and SN have been shown to
represent prediction errors, signals that are needed to update
the anticipated value of rewards and stimuli (Schultz et al.,
1997; Lak et al., 2014; Ruff and Fehr, 2014; Schultz, 2015).
Additionally, the amygdala and OFC are thought to encode
the anticipated value of stimuli (O’Doherty, 2004). Thus, it
is not surprising that previous studies using a single reward
type in humans have shown that the behavioral PIT effect
was associated with increased activity in NAcc and amygdala
(Talmi et al., 2008; Prévost et al., 2012; Garbusow et al.,
2014, 2016). Similarly, links between single reward-type-PIT
and NAcc and amygdala activity are well-established in rodents
(Corbit et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2001; Holland and Gallagher,
2003; Corbit and Balleine, 2005; Holmes et al., 2010; McCue
et al., 2014). Moreover, a recent rodent study demonstrated
that a specific cortico-striatal circuit between medial PFC
and NAcc is necessary to establish a successful PIT effect
(Keistler et al., 2015). Neural signals in the medial PFC are
believed to map all anticipated values and costs associated
with different options onto a common scale to facilitate
comparison and, ultimately, choosing between outcomes that
potentially differ in the type of rewards they generate (Rushworth
et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2012; Ruff and Fehr, 2014; Grueschow
et al., 2015). Given our results showing that subjective-value
matched rewards of three different types are equally effective
in promoting PIT, we speculate that the medial PFC could also
be a key neural structure modulating instrumental responding
during PIT in humans by mapping different options on a
common scale to make a final decision (Levy et al., 2012).
Further neuroimaging studies are required to better understand
the potential role of medial PFC on subcortical structures
in PIT.
Although we found very clear general PIT effects, we did
not see a specific PIT effect with any reward type. Based on
previous research, there are a number of possible explanations:
(1) We tested the participant’s responses using a transfer
paradigm requiring bimanual responses while the instrumental
conditioning was based on unimanual responses. There is only
a partial overlap in neural control processes across unimanual
and bimanual actions, which might diminish a transfer from
the unimanual to the bimanual condition (Nozaki et al., 2006;
Nozaki and Scott, 2009). In particular, healthy adults have
a strong preference for distributing force quasi-symmetrical
between the hands making the bimanual transfer condition
relatively insensitive to detecting deviations from this strong,
natural response tendency. (2) A shift to the non-dominant
hand might have led to an increase in perceived effort and
movement cost because the non-dominant hand is sometimes
considered as noisier (Salimpour and Shadmehr, 2014), both of
whichmight reduce the likelihood of engaging the non-dominant
hand when it is not strictly necessary. (3) In contrast to the
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 9 January 2017 | Volume 10 | Article 247
Lehner et al. Reward Types in PIT
general PIT, none of the participants reported a conscious
strategy for the specific PIT, which suggests that the distribution
of force between hands was controlled unconsciously. Given
that previous studies in humans have already shown the
importance of contingency awareness in PIT (Talmi et al., 2008;
Nadler et al., 2011; Lovibond et al., 2015), the unconscious
control of bimanual force distribution may have diminished
the specific PIT effect. Thus, the lack of specific PIT effects
may be due to difficulties in establishing a transfer effect
with this bimanual paradigm. Regardless of the limitations in
terms of measuring specific PIT, our paradigm provides a clear
demonstration of the influence of subjective-value on general PIT
effects.
Despite its limitations, the methodology employed in our
study lends itself to clinical investigations. Over the last few
years, there has been converging evidence to suggest that
reduced motivation to engage in social behavior may contribute
to many social deficits observed in autism spectrum disorder
(ASD; Scott-Van Zeeland et al., 2010; Delmonte et al., 2012;
Richey et al., 2014; Barman et al., 2015). However, none of
these studies have matched the subjective value of monetary
and social stimuli, so it is not clear whether individuals with
ASD have an issue with the subjective valuation network
in general or if there is a specific social deficit. Testing
participants with ASD and matched controls with an adapted
BDM auction as we used in the present study, might help to
better understand if the observed abnormalities in ASD could be
explained by differences in the reward valuation system and/or
in assigning incentive motivation to stimuli. Furthermore, we
speculate that combining our behavioral methodologies with
functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the role
of the value-based network in the cross-sensitization of drugs
(i.e., individuals suffering from alcohol dependence are on risk to
also suffer from a nicotine dependence, Grant et al., 2004) could
be a promising approach.
In conclusion, our study has demonstrated that stimuli of
all reward types were able to act as appetitive reinforcers
and influenced behavior, when matched on subjective reward
value. The strength of the general PIT was modulated by
subjective value (i.e., individuals who showed a stronger PIT
effect rated the value of rewards more highly). These findings
strengthen the hypotheses that the subjective value is crucial
for how much reward-associated stimuli influence instrumental
responding.
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